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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
COUNTDOWN TO MARTIAL LAW:  
THE U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONSHIP, 1969-1972  
 
 
 
 
August 2016 
 
 
Joven G. Maranan, B.A., University of Maryland, College Park 
M.A., University of Massachusetts, Boston 
 
 
Directed by Associate Professor Vincent Cannato 
 
 
Between 1969 and 1972, the Philippines experienced significant political unrest 
after Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos’ successful reelection campaign. Around the 
same time, American President Richard Nixon formulated a foreign policy approach that 
expected its allies to be responsible for their own self-defense. This would be known as 
the Nixon Doctrine. This approach resulted in Marcos’ declaration of martial law in 
September 1972, which American officials silently supported. American officials during 
this time also noted Marcos’ serving of American business and military interests. 
Existing literature differed on the extent Marcos served what he thought were American 
interests. Stanley Karnow’s In Our Image noted that Marcos did not adequately serve 
American interests, noting that he sent an insignificant amount of soldiers to Vietnam. 
Karnow also did not mention business interests. Raymond Bonner’s Waltzing with a 
Dictator mentioned that Marcos was effective for serving American business and military 
interests. James Hamilton-Paterson’s America’s Boy agrees with Bonner’s assessment, 
 
 
v 
also noting that Marcos served American business and military interests.  Materials from 
the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) and Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS) series affirmed Bonner and Hamilton-Paterson’s position, while noting that 
Karnow’s work was outdated because of the limited information he had when In Our 
Image was published. There are three issues that concerned the U.S.-Philippine 
relationship under President Marcos during this time. The first issue was the societal and 
political unrest that threatened to undermine Marcos. The second issue concerned U.S. 
officials’ application of the Nixon Doctrine to the Philippines. The third regarded 
President Marcos’ serving of military and business interests in the Philippines. Marcos 
supported maintaining America’s Filipino bases, which were important hubs of American 
military operations during the Vietnam War. In addition to military interests, President 
Marcos also aided American businesses in the Philippines, by removing restrictions that 
threatened American business activity. Each of these concerns led to President Marcos’ 
declaration of martial law. American officials’ tacit support for Marcos reflected their 
commitment to the Nixon Doctrine, which ensured political stability that preserved 
American business and military interests.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
On the night of September 21, 1972, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos 
issued Proclamation No. 1081, which declared martial law throughout the entire 
Philippines. Marcos made this declaration under the pretext of an assassination attempt 
on Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile. Years later, Enrile admitted this was staged.1 
The Proclamation declared President Marcos the Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine 
Armed Forces. Marcos also shut down newspapers, as well as television and radio 
stations. He also imposed a curfew between midnight and four o’clock in the morning. 
The Proclamation also ordered the arrest of Marcos’ political enemies and leftist activists. 
This included Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., of the opposition Liberal Party, whose widow 
Corazon Aquino would later succeed Marcos as President in 1986. Proclamation 1081 
turned the Philippines into an authoritarian regime. American officials did not make any 
public statements regarding martial law, and denied involvement in its planning.  
 Martial law was the result of the U.S.-Philippine relationship between 1969 and 
1972, in which American officials fostered an equal partnership. They applied the Nixon 
                                                
1 Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random House, 1989), 
359. 
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Doctrine, which reduced the American military presence in Asia. The Nixon Doctrine 
also affirmed that the United States expected its allies to be responsible for their own 
self-defense against internal enemies.2 However, it did not call for a complete phasing out 
of American troops abroad. It advocated a minimized role, which allowed the U.S. to 
protect its allies more efficiently by reducing its military expenditures without 
compromising their allies’ security. The Nixon Doctrine also promoted political stability 
within America’s allies.3 This stability allowed American business and military interests 
to be met. During this time, President Marcos served American business interests by 
easing restrictions on foreign property ownership and allowing foreign nationals to hold 
executive office in a Filipino based company. 4 Marcos and his supporters also ensured 
the continuity of the U.S. bases, which were important hubs for American military 
operations in Asia. However, this occurred during a period of political unrest. American 
officials were concerned that this unrest undermined Marcos’ power and that a potential 
successor would threaten base rights and business interests. Their tacit support for 
Marcos reflected their commitment to the Nixon Doctrine, which ensured political 
stability that preserved American business and military interests.  
Previous works on this relationship provide useful overviews on the roles that 
both American and Filipino officials played within it. Three important works that 
describe this relationship in detail are In Our Image, Waltzing With a Dictator, and 
America’s Boy. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Stanley Karnow’s In Our Image 
                                                
2 Daniel J. Sargent, A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 53. 
3 William J. Pomeroy, An American Made Tragedy: Neo-Colonialism and Dictatorship in the Philippines 
(New York: International Publishers, 1974), 93. 
4 Ibid., 100. 
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provided a detailed overview of the relationship from the American colonial period to 
Corazon Aquino’s ascension to the presidency. Investigative reporter Raymond Bonner’s 
Waltzing with a Dictator notes how President Marcos was a brilliant political tactician 
who knew more about the American political system than U.S. officials knew of the 
Filipino one.5 It mentions that American officials knew of President Marcos’ plans for 
martial law.6 Novelist James Hamilton-Paterson’s America’s Boy provides a detailed 
account of the Philippines under Marcos while including the author’s own personal 
accounts of living in the Philippines. Hamilton-Paterson notes that the American 
influence in the Philippines resulted in a dysfunctional Filipino society. These three 
works provide useful guides to understanding the U.S.-Philippine relationship under 
Marcos by noting its complexities.  
While they provide detailed accounts on the U.S.’ relationship with Marcos, the 
authors differ on the extent Marcos acted on what he believed were American interests. 
Karnow felt that Marcos did not adequately serve them. He mentioned that Marcos sent 
two thousand troops to fight in the Vietnam War in exchange for American financial aid. 
According to Karnow, Marcos wanted “to extract a maximum profit from a minimal 
investment.”7 Karnow also felt that the troop presence did little to serve American 
interests because of how small it was. By contrast, Bonner felt that President Marcos was 
effective for serving American interests. He writes that Marcos enhanced American 
business interests by issuing decrees that removed restrictions on American businesses. 8 
                                                
5 Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy (New 
York: Times Books, 1987), 7. 
6 Ibid., 96. 
7 Karnow, In Our Image, 376. 
8 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, 133-134. 
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Bonner also mentioned that Marcos supported the storage of nuclear weapons and the 
building of new facilities on the bases.9 Hamilton-Paterson also felt that Marcos was 
effective for serving American interests. He writes that Marcos agreed not to interfere 
with American businesses or investments in the Philippines in exchange for U.S. 
support.10 This debate over Marcos’ serving of American interests is important because it 
helps understand why U.S. officials tacitly supported him.  
 Recently declassified documents from the Digital National Security Archive 
(DNSA) and the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) confirm Bonner and 
Hamilton-Paterson’s characterization of President Marcos was effective for serving 
American interests. Ambassador Byroade’s September 22, 1972 telegram mentioned his 
discussion with Marcos on how to resolve threats to American business activity.11 By 
discussing these issues with Byroade, this confirms Bonner and Hamilton-Paterson’s 
position. This telegram refutes Karnow’s argument that Marcos did not adequately serve 
American interests. While Karnow’s assessment of the Filipino troop presence in 
Vietnam was accurate, his material limited his analysis of Marcos’ relationship with the 
U.S. While In Our Image provided a useful understanding of the U.S. relationship with 
Marcos, it is outdated because of the dearth of analysis on American interests. American 
interests were important to understand the relationship because it was a reason why 
American officials supported martial law. The DNSA and FRUS provide ample evidence 
                                                
9 Ibid., 133. 
10 James Hamilton-Paterson, America’s Boy: A Century of Colonialism in the Philippines (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1998), 285. 
11 Document #259, “Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State” dated 
September 22, 1972, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-
1972, Vol. 20, Southeast Asia, 1969-1972 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2006), 553-
554. 
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that favor Bonner and Hamilton-Paterson’s position on Marcos’ serving of American 
interests over Karnow’s.  
There were three issues that defined the U.S.-Philippine relationship under 
President Marcos prior to martial law. The first was the political unrest, which 
undermined on President Marcos’ legitimacy. The second concerned how the U.S. 
applied the Nixon Doctrine to Philippines. The third issue related to how President 
Marcos maintained American military and business interests in the Philippines. Each of 
these concerns led to American tacit support for President Marcos’ declaration of martial 
law and further expansion of his powers.  
Between 1969 and 1972, the Philippines experienced significant political unrest 
that resulted in instability. During the 1969 presidential elections, Marcos’ Nacionalista 
Party and the opposition Liberal Party owned private armies who physically intimidated 
voters.12 In early 1970, violent leftist demonstrations occurred frequently during a period 
now known as the First Quarter Storm. Communist sympathizers allegedly hurled 
explosives into the Esso and Caltex offices in January 1971.13 There were also many 
other incidences of politically motivated violence that occurred throughout the period. 
Much of this political instability was a reaction to the increasing inequality and 
corruption in Filipino society. This unrest threatened to unseat President Marcos.  
American officials applied the Nixon Doctrine to the Philippines by reducing its 
military presence and ensuring that Marcos remained President. They hoped this would 
                                                
12 Filemon C. Rodriguez, The Marcos Regime: Rape of the Nation (New York: Vantage Press, 1985), 35. 
13 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Philippines: The Radical Movements,” 
May 3, 1971, in The Philippines: U.S. Policy During the Marcos Years, 1965-1986, Digital National 
Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 9, 
http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_ph/docview/1679142982/. 
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reduce the overt dominance the United States had over its former colony. This also 
allowed the Philippines to become more responsible for its own protection. Applying the 
Nixon Doctrine in the Philippines also required maintaining political stability, which 
meant ensuring that Marcos remained President. This meant encouraging him to 
implement measures such as land reform that would prevent a popular uprising from 
occurring. By applying the Nixon Doctrine, the United States maintained stability by 
ensuring that Marcos would remain President of the Philippines.  
During this time, President Marcos also served American military and business 
interests, which were threatened by opposition forces. Despite the minimized presence, 
U.S. officials viewed its Philippine bases as being an important center of military 
operations in Asia. These bases were agreed to in the Military Bases Agreement (MBA), 
which granted the United States a ninety-nine year lease on several sites.14 The two most 
important bases were Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station, both situated on 
Luzon Island. They experienced an increase in activity during the Vietnam War due to 
the Philippines’ relative proximity to former French Indochina. However, Nixon called 
for a policy known as Vietnamization, which pushed for the phasing out of American 
involvement in Vietnam. This policy applied the Nixon Doctrine to the Vietnam War by 
encouraging an increased South Vietnamese role in the war. This would also increase the 
importance of America’s Filipino bases, especially Subic Bay, because fewer troops 
meant more naval presence. American officials continued to maintain a minimized 
presence in the Philippines, which became important to strategic interests in Asia.  
                                                
14 Pomeroy, An American Made Tragedy, 21. 
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American officials supported President Marcos because his supporters within the 
Constitutional Convention delegates favored maintaining bases. This convention was 
meant to reform the 1935 Constitution, which many Filipinos felt was outdated. Much of 
the convention consisted of Marcos supporters, who supported pro-American measures. 
Marcos’ supporters released a study that concluded that continued American military 
presence would be in the Philippines’ self-interest.15 This gave U.S. Embassy officials 
hope that base rights would not be threatened. American officials continued to support 
President Marcos, knowing that his supporters favored retaining the bases.  
 In addition to military bases, the U.S. presence in the Philippines also included 
American businesses. At least forty percent of the top two hundred Philippine 
corporations were American owned.16 Around eight hundred American companies 
operated in the Philippines. This included Mobil, Georgia-Pacific, Union Carbide, 
General Motors, United Fruit, General Electric, Pfizer, and Colgate-Palmolive.17 A staff 
report from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations estimated that American direct 
investment in the Philippines as of December 1970 was at $710 million.18 American 
businesses dominated many sectors of the Filipino economy, which further highlighted 
the overall American presence.  
 The Laurel-Langley trade agreement also became relevant during this time 
because its eventual expiration would impact the economic relationship between the 
                                                
15 Embassy of the United States of America, Manila, Philippines “Status of the Foreign Bases Question in 
the Philippine Constitutional Convention,” July 1, 1972, The Philippines: U.S. Policy During the Marcos 
Years, 1965-1986, Digital National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington D.C., 5, 
http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_ph/docview/1679151267/. 
16 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Korea and the Philippines, November 1972, A 
Staff Report Prepared for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate  
 (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1973), 35. 
17 Pomeroy, An American Made Tragedy, 43. 
18 U.S. Congress, Senate, Korea and the Philippines, 35. 
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Philippines and the United States. American diplomat James Langley and Filipino senator 
Jose P. Laurel signed the agreement in 1955. It succeeded the 1946 Bell Trade Act, which 
granted both American and Filipino citizens equal access to resources such as agriculture, 
timber, minerals, public utilities, and land.19 The Bell Trade Act gave Filipino sugar 
producers exclusive access to the American market. Laurel-Langley continued equal 
access to Filipino resources and extended the sugar quota. The United States became the 
largest importer of Filipino sugar. While the agreement expired in 1974, American 
officials were confident that Marcos would find ways to work around issues resulting 
from Laurel-Langley’s expiration.  
During this time, the Luzon Stevedoring and Quasha court decisions threatened 
American business interests in the Philippines. In the Luzon Stevedoring decision, the 
court ruled that foreign nationals could not hold executive office in Philippine based 
companies after 1974, when Laurel-Langley expired.20 This decision threatened 
Americans’ ability to control their Filipino subsidiaries. The Quasha decision threatened 
the ability of American citizens and companies to own properties after the Laurel-
Langley’s expiration. American William Quasha inquired to the Philippine Supreme 
Court on whether or not Laurel-Langley’s expiration would affect his land holdings.21 
The court ruled against him. U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Henry A. Byroade 
discussed these cases with President Marcos, who assured the Ambassador that his 
                                                
19 Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980 (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1988), 28. 
20 Albert F. Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 112. 
21 Kolko, Confronting the Third World, 251. 
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Administration would take care of them. Following martial law, President Marcos issued 
decrees that reversed these decisions.   
American officials supported President Marcos because his administration 
ensured political stability that preserved American military and business interests. The 
Philippines faced significant political instability during that time, marked by significant 
violence. This led to President Marcos taking action to bring order in his country. Despite 
the change within Filipino government, martial law continued the status quo with respect 
to American business and military interests. American officials’ tacit support for 
President Marcos reflected their commitment to the Nixon Doctrine, which ensured 
political stability that preserved their interests. 
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CHAPTER 2 
1969: SETTING THE STAGE FOR MARTIAL LAW  
 
 
 
The year 1969 became an important one for U.S.-Philippine relations because it 
helped set the stage for President Marcos’ declaration of martial law three years later. 
Recently inaugurated President Richard Nixon called for a change in the relationship 
between the U.S. and its allies during his visit to Guam. Both his administration and 
President Marcos hoped to change the conventional perception that Filipino governments 
were American puppets. The Nixon Administration also planned to reduce American 
military presence in the Philippines, while maintaining enough troops to protect 
American interests. Nixon also appointed longtime statesman Henry A. Byroade as 
Ambassador to Manila. Byroade became important to the U.S.-Philippine relationship 
because he grew closer to President Marcos than his predecessors.  
Around the same time, Democratic Senator Stuart A. Symington of Missouri held 
hearings regarding America’s foreign policy, especially regarding the Vietnam War. That 
autumn, the Symington Subcommittee focused its matters on U.S. allies’ role in Asia, 
including the Philippines. President Marcos was also running in a reelection campaign, 
which became one of the most controversial in Philippine history because of the tactics
   11  
 
that were used throughout it. The U.S.-Philippine relationship in the 1969 reflected a 
change in the perceived special relationship, in which U.S. had significant influence over 
its former colony. The Philippines would be more responsible for its self-defense, while 
at the same time continuing to serve American interests in the region, which included 
maintaining the bases. 
President Marcos mentioned changing this special relationship between the U.S. 
and the Philippines during his visit to Washington in early April. He met with National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and National Security Council staff member Lindsey 
Grant. President Marcos told them that the Philippines “must be seen ‘not as a puppet, 
but as a friend.’ ”1 He also said that the United States should consult its Asian allies 
rather than imposing solutions on Asia. Kissinger assured him President Nixon would 
consult them. Marcos also reiterated that he wished to remain close to the United States, 
but “adopt a stance of independence.“2 Kissinger agreed, noting that the U.S. did not 
want satellite states. Marcos also wanted the American bases to remain in the Philippines 
because there should always be a U.S. presence in Asia. This conversation would bring a 
change in how to approach the U.S.-Philippine relationship. While Marcos wanted more 
independence from the United States, he displayed a willingness to serve American 
military interests by continuing to support the bases.  
 In the same conversation, President Marcos suggested changing the Philippines’ 
role in the Vietnam War, which included phasing out its troop presence. He felt that the 
Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG), which roughly numbered two thousand 
                                                
1 Document #186, “Memorandum of Conversation” dated April 2, 1969, in United States Department of 
State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 20, Southeast Asia, 1969-1972 (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 394. 
2 Ibid., 395. 
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soldiers, should withdraw from the Vietnam War because it was very expensive to 
maintain.3 Marcos suggested that the Philippines should concentrate on helping the South 
Vietnamese government develop an effective constabulary force. PHILCAG’s presence 
in Vietnam was symbolic, since it did not participate in much combat during the war. 
Some Filipinos thought it was nothing more than a group of mercenaries, and that 
President Marcos had sent these troops in exchange for funds.  
In addition to PHILCAG, President Marcos also mentioned his concerns 
regarding the Filipino economy to American Embassy official James Rafferty in April. 
They discussed the bilateral Laurel-Langley trade agreement, which granted American 
businesses parity rights in the Philippines, which included the right to own property. It 
also gave Filipino sugar producers exclusive access to the American market. This 
resulted in the Philippines exporting a significant portion of its sugar to the United States. 
However, the agreement was set to expire in 1974. Marcos asked Nixon to extend these 
privileges, fearing that the Filipino economy might collapse. Nixon agreed with Marcos’ 
request for the extension of these privileges, noting that things could be “worked out.”4 
President Marcos seemed to trust U.S. officials and felt that the United States would 
continue to support him politically. Despite these concerns, the American and Filipino 
governments remained on friendly terms and were cooperative with each other.  
During this time, the United States was planning to reduce its involvement in 
Vietnam, which would affect American base operations in the Philippines. Around June, 
President Nixon announced the withdrawal of 25,000 ground troops from Vietnam. This 
                                                
3 Ibid. 
4 Document #187, “Memorandum of Conversation” dated April 2, 1969, in United States Department of 
State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 20, Southeast Asia, 1969-1972 (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 398.  
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was the beginning of a policy of Vietnamization, which called for a gradual reduction of 
U.S. troop involvement, while at the same time an increase in the training and equipping 
of South Vietnamese personnel for continued combat against the North Vietnamese and 
the Viet Cong.5 Much of this was consistent with the Nixon Administration’s 
commitment to find a way to end U.S. involvement in Vietnam. On the one hand, 
reducing this presence might impact the Philippines because there would be less activity 
at its bases. However, Vietnamization also increased the importance of the U.S. bases in 
the Philippines because, especially Subic Bay. Fewer ground troops might mean an 
increased naval presence in Asia. Thus, the Philippines remained important in discussions 
regarding American foreign policy in Asia. Despite the eventual phasing out of American 
involvement in Vietnam, its Filipino bases remained important hubs of American military 
operations in Asia.  
Throughout the year, Marcos campaigned for reelection as President on the 
Nacionalista ticket. The Nacionalista Party ran on a platform that promised expanded 
social services, industrialization, law enforcement, and a streamlined bureaucracy.6 His 
opponent was Senator Sergio Osmeña, Jr., of the Liberal Party. Senator Osmeña was the 
son of former President Sergio Osmeña, Sr. Both parties proposed similar programs, but 
Liberals emphasized free enterprise and foreign investment, while the Nacionalistas 
emphasized economic nationalism. Nonetheless, the parties’ positions remained 
indistinguishable from each other. Rhetoric rather than policy positions distinguished the 
two candidates. In addition to similar proposals, both espoused pro-American rhetoric 
                                                
5 Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy (New 
York: Times Books, 1987), 64. 
6 Filemon C. Rodriguez, The Marcos Regime: Rape of the Nation (New York: Vantage Press, 1985), 34.  
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and supported increased American aid to the Philippines. The 1969 elections would 
become known for its campaign tactics, rather than policy debates. Marcos was 
determined to defeat Osmeña, and be reelected as President.  
American officials attempted to play a neutral role in the elections, which proved 
to be difficult. Prior to Nixon’s visit to Manila in July, Acting Executive Secretary of 
State Department John P. Walsh wrote to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger 
regarding Nixon’s plans to meet President Marcos’ opponent Sergio Osmeña. Walsh felt 
that Filipinos would interpret Nixon’s visit as having an important bearing on their 
Presidential election.7 He felt that if Nixon failed to meet with Osmeña, the Filipino 
public would interpret this as an endorsement of President Marcos. Walsh did not rule out 
the possibility that Osmeña could defeat the incumbent Philippine president. He then 
noted that the only argument against meeting with Senator Osmeña was the possibility of 
offending President Marcos.8 Walsh suggested that U.S. officials should inform Marcos 
that Osmeña requested a meeting with President Nixon. The United States attempted to 
work with both sides due to a possibility that Osmeña might defeat Marcos. They also did 
not want the Filipino public to think that it supported Marcos because it could hurt his 
chances of being reelected. President Nixon ultimately met with Osmeña in an effort to 
remain neutral towards the upcoming November elections. While American officials 
continued to support Marcos, they needed to show that they were acting independently of 
his interests. This meant meeting with both candidates, which would prevent the 
                                                
7 Document #190, “Memorandum from the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) 
to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)” dated April 2, 1969, in United States 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, Vol. 20, Southeast Asia, 1969-
1972 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2006), 402. 
8 Ibid., 403. 
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perception that the U.S. favored one candidate over the other. There was a public 
perception that the American officials intervened in previous Philippine Presidential 
elections, most notably in 1949.9 U.S. officials hoped to change this perception by 
portraying themselves as being neutral. This neutrality would also remain consistent with 
Nixon and Kissinger’s pledge to display a relationship of equal partners. 
Prior to his visit to Manila, President Nixon announced a new strategy for 
American foreign policy during a press conference in Guam. This strategy became 
known as the Nixon Doctrine. He announced that the United States would offer military 
assistance to its allies, but that they were also responsible for their own self-defense.10 In 
his speech, Nixon stated the U.S. “should assist, but…not dictate” its Asian allies.11 
Nixon called for a more balanced relationship between the U.S. and its allies. He made 
this announcement in the wake of the Vietnam War, which was becoming unpopular 
among the American public. In his speech, he noted that the war had been a “terribly 
frustrating one.”12 The American public did not want significant U.S. military 
involvement in the affairs of other countries. Much of the Nixon Doctrine was also 
consistent with previous remarks made by the American officials regarding the 
Philippines. This foreign policy approach provided opportunities for President Marcos to 
assert his independence over the United States, while continuing to serve American 
interests at the same time.  
                                                
9 William J. Pomeroy, An American Made Tragedy: Neo-Colonialism and Dictatorship in the Philippines 
(New York: International Publishers, 1974), 80. 
10 Daniel J. Sargent, A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 
1970’s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 53.  
11 Richard Nixon, “Informal Remarks with Guam Newsmen, July 25, 1969,” in Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 
1971), 548.  
12 Ibid., 546.  
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President Nixon finally arrived in Manila in July 1969, shortly after announcing 
his foreign policy approach in Guam. The Philippine honor guard played their rendition 
of the popular Al Jolson song “California, Here I Come,” as a tribute to Nixon’s home 
state.13 Government employees, students, and ROTC students turned out to greet 
President Nixon along a six-and-a-half-mile route from the airport to Marcos’ residence 
at Malacañang Palace. They waved American flags while carrying placards that 
congratulated the U.S. for sending the first men to walk on the Moon. This welcome 
reflected the complicated relationship the Filipino public has with the United States. 
Filipinos have historically viewed the United States as the “mother country,” due to the 
Philippines’ status as a former American colony. Nixon’s trip would evoke a wide range 
of reactions from many different groups in Philippines.  
Despite the positive reception Nixon received from many Filipinos upon his 
arrival, his visit also brought out anti-American protestors. There were protests held in 
front of the U.S. Embassy. Students also burned American flags and effigies of the 
American President. An unknown individual also threw a Molotov cocktail at the U.S. 
Information Service library, blowing up an exhibit and killing one person.14 Another 
unknown individual also hurled a grenade at the embassy. This showed that not all 
Filipinos were happy with Nixon’s visit. These people were especially upset at the 
American base presence in the country. This group also felt a sense of Filipino 
nationalism that strived to assert its cultural independence from the U.S. These protestors 
highlighted the divide within the Filipino public opinion on the United States.  
                                                
13 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, 64. 
14 Ibid. 
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Nixon’s visit gave Marcos the opportunity to develop a strong relationship with 
the recently inaugurated Nixon, whom he felt could serve his reelection campaign. He 
invited his American counterpart to spend the night at Malacañang in the hopes of 
creating the impression that the U.S. endorsed him for the presidency.15 President Marcos 
knew if he allowed President Nixon to spend the night at his residence, his critics could 
not criticize him for not being sufficiently pro-American. This would help win votes from 
much of the Philippine elite who had economic interests in the United States. Nixon had 
initially chosen to stay at a hotel, but finally agreed to stay at the President’s residence. 
Marcos’ wife, Imelda, spent millions of dollars on renovating Malacañang to 
accommodate President and Mrs. Nixon. Marcos was determined to win Nixon’s favor.  
In August 1969, Nixon appointed Henry A. Byroade as the U.S. Ambassador to 
the Philippines. An Indiana native, Byroade graduated from West Point and served as 
both a lieutenant colonel and a brigadier general in World War II. He previously served 
as Ambassador to Egypt, South Africa, Afghanistan, and Burma.16 He would serve as 
Ambassador to the Philippines for nearly four years, which made him the longest serving 
American ambassador since Philippine independence. Byroade became close with both 
President and Mrs. Marcos during his tenure. Ferdinand Marcos and Henry Byroade had 
similar public personas; both men were said to have served in World War II and had 
reputations for being womanizers. However, Marcos’ name never showed up on U.S 
government records, which puts into question his military service.17 These similarities 
made President Marcos closer to Ambassador Byroade than his predecessors. However, 
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Ambassador Byroade would not let his friendship with Marcos get in the way of asserting 
U.S. interests that conflicted with Marcos’ interests. Nonetheless, the relationship 
between the two remained friendly.   
During this time, the Symington subcommittee hearings revealed the quid pro quo 
relationship between the United States and the Philippines. In late September and early 
October 1969, a congressional subcommittee led by Missouri Senator Stuart Symington 
held hearings on the Philippines role in U.S. foreign policy during this time. The 
subcommittee was created earlier in February, but focused mostly on the Vietnam War. 
By late September, the committee held hearings on the role of other Asian countries in 
supporting the American war effort. During a hearing, Senator Symington questioned 
Lieutenant General Robert H. Warren, who was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Military Assistance and Sales. Symington asked him what the real purpose of 
American military assistance was and whether or not it came down to “a quid pro quo for 
the bases and a means of contributing to the Filipino government.”18 Warren agreed that 
the military assistance reflected a quid pro quo relationship, but also noted that it was also 
meant “to maintain internal security and stability and, thereby, make our own activities 
over there more secure.”19 Symington then asked if this meant that the U.S. was paying 
the Philippine government to protect them from anti-Americanism and anti-Marcos 
activists. General Warren replied that this was correct to “a degree.”20 The Symington 
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subcommittee implicated that the American presence in the Philippines was partly to 
crack down on anti-American groups. While it was not the primary reason for U.S. 
military assistance in the Philippines, it indicated that there were more interests that went 
beyond Filipino national security. The committee hearings revealed that the United States 
gave military assistance in exchange for base rights. These frustrated American officials, 
who felt the hearings threatened cooperation with America’s allies.   
The Symington subcommittee hearings concerned Ambassador Byroade, who felt 
hurt U.S. ability to effectively create policy towards its Asian allies. He was disturbed by 
the implications of the proceedings, which he felt questioned the control over the conduct 
of American foreign relations.21 He also thought they portrayed a distorted and 
unbalanced picture of American foreign policy in Asia. Byroade expressed concern that 
hearings would threaten U.S. ability to enter confidential agreements with other 
governments. Lastly, he recommended to President Nixon and Secretary of State William 
Rogers that they consider disassociating the Executive Branch from the whole affair.22 
The Subcommittee transcripts were released only after the Philippine Presidential 
election ended. 23 Hiding this information until the end of the election indicated that the 
United States continued to support President Marcos because they did not want the 
subcommittee to impact the outcome of the elections. Despite Byroade’s concerns, the 
Symington subcommittee would not hurt America’s relationship in the Philippines.  
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In spite of the subcommittee’s revelations, the United States remained committed 
to portraying its relationship with the Philippines of one of equal partners. Kissinger’s 
October 20 memorandum to Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson noted Nixon’s 
desire to reduce America’s presence in the Philippines. Kissinger wrote that the President 
intended to eliminate aspects of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) that gave the U.S. 
advantages which it does not possess elsewhere.24 Nixon intended to reduce the 
privileges and immunities enjoyed by the U.S. regarding base rights down to a level 
comparable to rights the U.S. possessed in other countries with American bases. He 
directed the Under Secretaries’ Committee to undertake a review of the treaty, to examine 
how to change its provisions.25 Nixon also directed the committee to examine how much 
land would be surplus to American military needs. He planned to invite the Philippine 
Government to renegotiate the agreement. However, Nixon noted that this must happen 
after the Philippine elections because of the possibility that Osmeña might defeat 
Marcos.26 By calling for a study to examine the U.S. military presence in the Philippines, 
President Nixon intended to determine how much land was superfluous to American 
military interests in the region. This remained consistent with the Nixon Doctrine’s 
calling for a reduced American military presence that encouraged Marcos to be more 
responsible for his country’s self-defense. .   
On November 11, President Ferdinand Marcos won his reelection campaign in 
one of the most controversial campaigns in Filipino history. The results showed that he 
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defeated Osmeña with over sixty percent of the vote. This victory was the first time a 
Filipino president won his or her reelection campaign. Despite the official results 
showing that President Marcos won in landslide, his victory remained suspicious to many 
observers such as Filipino leftist activists.  
The 1969 election was one of the most expensive presidential elections in 
Philippine history. President Marcos spent $50 million on the campaign, much of which 
came from public funds.27 This access to public money gave President Marcos more 
resources to produce a more successful campaign than his opponents. His campaign also 
bribed local politicians, who rigged the election in Marcos’ favor. Ernest Maceda, 
Marcos’ campaign manager, spent a total of 100 million pesos, roughly $25 million, in 
briberies.28 He hopped around the islands, dispensing peso-filed envelopes to barrio 
captains and city mayors. This also reflected the institutionalizing of the patronage 
system, in which Marcos gave local authorities money in exchange for their support. 
Marcos’ excessive campaign spending put into question the validity of the results. 
In addition to bribery, the Marcos campaign used physical intimidation. Election 
workers filled out ballots for Marcos’ Nacionalista Party while being watched over by 
two armed men in civilian clothes.29 Military gangs, which consisted of Philippine 
Constabulary murder squads, terrorized provincial electorates.30 These groups intended to 
scare voters into supporting President Marcos. This proved successful as Marcos won by 
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a significant landslide. It also showed that President Marcos took drastic measures to 
ensure that he would be reelected.  
Marcos’ excessive campaign spending weakened the Philippine economy, which 
resulted in Marcos’ waning popularity. This infusion of large sums of money into the 
economy created high inflation. Prices rose while the peso was devalued. This caused 
greater economic hardships for the poorest Filipinos. The Filipino public’s dissatisfaction 
with the economy and its government increased significantly after the 1969 elections 
because of the violence and economic turmoil that resulted after. They also perceived 
what they saw was government corruption. In the months and years that followed the 
election, the political and economic situation in the Philippines became increasingly 
unstable. This would lead to public outcry that lasted for several years until his 
declaration in 1972. 
In December 1969, PHILCAG withdrew from Vietnam shortly after the 
Symington Subcommittee’s reports revealed the quid pro quo relationship between the 
U.S. and the Philippines. The report confirmed the perception that it was nothing more 
than a group of mercenary soldiers. Protests against PHILCAG emerged during this time. 
This characterization of PHILCAG as mercenaries had angered President Marcos, which 
led him to withdraw all remaining troops in Vietnam.31  
The year 1969 set the stage for much of the U.S.-Philippine relationship that 
occurred between President Nixon and President Marcos’ Administrations. The Nixon 
Doctrine called for more self-defense from its own allies, while continuing to offer them 
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protection. This led to President Marcos’ increased power over the Filipino government. 
His reelection changed the situation in the Philippines, by creating significant economic 
and political instability that resulted from his campaign’s spending.  This instability 
would bring about societal unrest, which remained a significant problem until Marcos’ 
declaration of martial law. 
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CHAPTER 3 
1970: THE UNRAVELING OF TURMOIL 
 
 
 
The year 1970 would lead to significant unrest that resulted from Marcos’ 
reelection. Student-led protests emerged as a reaction to increased income inequality and 
continued American military presence. Many of the protesters were members of left-wing 
organizations that flourished during this time. U.S. Embassy and State Department 
officials monitored these groups to help the Filipino government undermine them. Both 
U.S. and Filipino officials also looked toward the upcoming Constitutional Convention, 
in which serious discussion had emerged in 1970. That fall, the Philippines held an 
election to elect delegates who would be drafting the new Constitution. Marcos’ 
Administration expressed concern that the Convention could undermine his power, and 
told American officials such as Nixon and Kissinger that leftists could take over the 
Philippines. American officials felt these concerns were exaggerated. However, they also 
felt that the political unrest that resulted from the protests would undermine his power 
more than the Constitutional Convention.   
Upon delivering his State of the Nation Address on January 26, President Marcos 
was met by 20,000 jeering students, workers and peasants. The mob pelted rocks and 
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bottles at him. Four days later, demonstrators tried to storm Malacañang Palace. They 
also burned candles nearby, next to a realistic coffin that symbolized the death of Filipino 
democracy. The next day, demonstrators shouted “Yankee, go home!” and “Imperialist 
pigs!”1 They also ripped the large circular U.S. seal off the Embassy’s outer brick wall. 
U.S. Marine security personnel threw tear gas grenades, which caused the mob to retreat 
to a nearby business district. The demonstrators then smashed the windows of local 
businesses and burned cars. These demonstrations continued for the next two months, and 
became known as the First Quarter Storm because it occurred primarily in the first three 
months of the year.   
The First Quarter Storm occurred during a time in which the Filipino public 
became increasingly disenchanted with social inequality and government corruption. 
Many of the demonstrators were students, primarily from the University of the 
Philippines (UP). UP became a hotbed of left-wing activism. However, most of the 
protestors were more interested in addressing income inequality and government 
corruption than Marxist-Leninist theory.2 These students also suspected President Marcos 
of planning to remain in power beyond his second term. Despite their distrust of the 
government, many activists supported populist reforms such as land redistribution. While 
not all the protestors were self-proclaimed Marxists, they all agreed that something must 
be done to address the increasing poverty in the country.  
These protests troubled President Marcos, who became distrustful of the United 
States. He met Ambassador Byroade on the morning after the January 26 riots. According 
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to Byroade, Marcos could not sleep the night before because the demonstrations and riots 
came “as a jolt to him.”3 He told the ambassador that his intelligence advisors tried to 
convince him that that the U.S. had been implicated in the riots. Byroade denied these 
allegations, assuring Marcos that the U.S. would not interfere in the internal affairs of the 
Philippines.4 The Ambassador recognized that Filipino politicians claimed American 
support and backing. Byroade later noted President Marcos and Imelda’s paranoia, 
mentioning that they told confidants that they believed that the U.S. instigated 
demonstrations against Malacañang. The ambassador wrote to Marshall Green, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, that America’s main 
problem at that moment was helping Marcos keep his cool. Byroade recommended that 
the American officials reassure Marcos that the United States would not be involved in 
these internal matters.   
 National Security Council and Embassy officials paid significant attention to the 
demonstrations and concluded that the protests were against government corruption.  
Henry Kissinger’s memorandum to President Nixon concluded that the proximate cause 
of student-led riots were their demand that political parties, especially Marcos’ own 
Nacionalista Party, not influence the Constitutional Convention elections held that 
November.5 Protestors feared that Marcos could influence the Convention and rig the 
Constitution in his favor. Kissinger also wrote that the U.S. hoped that these 
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demonstrations would motivate President Marcos to prioritize social and economic 
reforms in his second term. By prioritizing reforms, the Filipino president could prevent a 
potential popular uprising that would result from a worsened situation. The U.S. felt that 
Marcos needed to acquiesce to some of the protestors’ concerns or else they risked his 
disposal.    
The First Quarter Storm concerned Marcos, who told Byroade that he might 
declare martial law to impose order. Marcos wanted to know if Byroade would “stand 
behind him.”6 Byroade reacted cautiously to prevent significant U.S. involvement in the 
situation. The ambassador suggested social programs and land reform, instead of taking 
drastic measures such as martial law.7 He also noted that President Marcos was truly 
afraid of a possible revolution. Ambassador Byroade also needed to minimize U.S. 
involvement, knowing that there would be significant anti-American backlash if they 
were to get significantly involved. American officials continued to reinforce to Marcos 
the need to implement reforms, which they felt would allow him to remain in power. 
The First Quarter Storm occurred around the same time there was a proliferation 
of activism and protests throughout the world. In the May 1968 Paris strikes, French 
students and radicals protested the status quo in French society and Gaullism. Anti-
Vietnam war protests, many of which involved students, also remained commonplace in 
America during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Kent State massacre occurred during 
a Vietnam War protest that May, which led to public outrage in the United States. This 
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also intensified debate in democracies over the right to protest foreign policy.8 The New 
Left also emerged in the West, and tried to address social inequalities. While these events 
and movements were not directly related to the First Quarter Storm, they reflect the 
proliferation of activism throughout the world during the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
The First Quarter Storm dissipated in the month of April, when many students 
were on break from school. However, left-wing activism remained significant during this 
time. Marcos and the U.S. monitored much of these groups’ activities. The two largest 
organizations were the Marxist-Leninist Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas-1930 (PKP) and 
the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).  While the PKP was older, the 
CPP became more significant. Former UP lecturer Jose Maria Sison left the PKP to form 
the CPP in 1968.9 The PKP and CPP were nominally aligned with Moscow and Beijing, 
respectively. The PKP would eventually support Marcos after martial law, when they 
struck a deal that legitimized the party. By contrast, Philippine government banned the 
CPP, who remain illegal to this day. The CPP’s armed wing, the New People's Army 
(NPA), is still designated as a terrorist organization by the Philippines, the United States, 
and the European Union. President Marcos blamed the NPA for much of the violence 
before and after martial law, despite accusations that his own men had conducted some of 
the violence.10 He also felt threatened by the Communists because they addressed social 
injustice in Philippine society, which made their cause compelling to a segment of the 
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Filipino population. This could be problematic for the U.S., which remained committed 
to stopping the further expansion of communism.  
American officials responded to the protests by providing riot gear, which 
allowed police to suppress protestors more effectively. In April, the Philippine 
government sent a request to the United States, which asked for riot control equipment. 
The following May, Richard E. Usher, the director of Philippine affairs at the Bureau of 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, requested that the American government use $75,000 to 
fund riot control equipment for the Philippines.11 The equipment included helmets and 
gas masks. He noted that both the Embassy and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) believed that it was in the U.S.’ best interest to grant 
riot control as a one-time response to the Philippines. U.S. officials approved this 
measure. By providing riot gear to President Marcos, the United States had an interest in 
preserving order in the Philippines.  
In addition to the First Quarter Storm, U.S. officials such as Kissinger and 
Byroade became preoccupied with the Williams case, which threatened the U.S.-
Philippine relationship by highlighting misconduct committed by American military 
personnel. Air Force Sergeant Bernard Williams at Clark was accused of complicity in an 
attempted rape case in nearby Angeles City, in which the accused were American 
soldiers.12 His supervisors allowed him to depart on reassignment while the judicial 
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procedures were pending against him. Kissinger wrote that anti-American elements in the 
Philippines used the Williams case as an affront to Philippine sovereignty and to inspire 
more protests against the Marcos government.13 Byroade also felt that the Filipino 
government highlighted this to deflect attention from economic and social issues. 
Kissinger requested that they return Williams to the Philippines so that Philippine courts 
could prosecute him. U.S. officials risked straining its relationship with the Marcos 
government if the military prosecuted Williams instead of the Filipino courts. They 
returned Williams, who stood trial and was acquitted of the charges against him.14 In the 
wake of the First Quarter Storm, the United States did not need more bad publicity in the 
Philippines. This remained consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, by allowing the Filipino 
authorities to take care of affairs that occurred on its soil.  
U.S. officials would release public statements that attempted to dispel myths 
about the dominant relationship between the Philippines. The Embassy released a non-
classified fact sheet, dated April 10, that tried to disprove allegations that the U.S. 
deliberately kept Philippines a non-industrialized country to maintain access to its raw 
materials, while exporting manufacturing goods there. The report refuted this by noting 
that U.S. programs contributed to the development of Philippine industry by providing 
loans to Philippine companies. 15 The fact sheet also dispelled the myth that USAID 
programs focused on agriculture at the expense of industry by noting that most of the 
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assistance went into infrastructure development designed to benefit the whole economy.16 
Embassy officials tried to dispel this idea to show that the U.S. did not have a special 
relationship with the Philippines anymore. They hoped that the public perception of the 
U.S.-Philippine relationship was one of equal partners, unlike before. 
The National Security Council’s Under Secretaries Committee published a 
classified review of American bases and facilities in the Philippines. This was created as 
a result of Kissinger’s October 1969 memorandum that requested the undertaking of the 
treaty and other relationships with the Philippines. The study concluded that the U.S. did 
not control a disproportionate share of land in the Philippines. The report noted that the 
Air Force could relinquish some land without hurting base expansion requirements, 
security, or integrity.17 This also continued to remain consistent with the Nixon 
Administration’s efforts to reduce U.S. military presence, in order to make efficient use 
of the military. It also reinforced the idea that the Nixon Doctrine did not call for the end 
of American presence in Asia. Instead, it called for careful planning on U.S. military 
operations.  
This optimism Kissinger felt regarding American bases in the Philippines would 
also be seen in Byroade’s relationship with President Marcos. He praised him as being an 
effective politician who did more for the Filipino people than “many of the Presidents 
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combined.”18 According to Byroade, Marcos built more roads and schools than his 
predecessors. The Ambassador noted that Marcos could work towards goals that were 
both in the interest of the U.S. and the Philippines. He also described Marcos as being 
easy and pleasant to work with. Byroade also characterized him as being “quite pro-
American.”19 The Ambassador had successfully cultivated a close U.S.-Philippine 
relationship with President Marcos.  
Around the same time, the United States set out details on reducing its presence 
within its Filipino bases. The Under Secretaries Committee called for a thirty-three 
percent reduction of personnel at Clark and a twenty-five percent reduction of personnel 
at other facilities.20 This reduced the U.S. military presence in the Philippines to pre-
Vietnam war levels. However, Kissinger noted that these reductions required the laying 
off of thousands of Filipino workers and the loss of millions in foreign exchange. Despite 
these issues, he noted that the U.S. could resolve these issues by emphasizing bilateral 
military agreements and multilateral trade agreements.21 Kissinger hoped that the U.S. 
could continue to maintain its military presence more efficiently by reducing its numbers, 
to sustain itself once the U.S. ended its involvement in the Vietnam War.  
During this time, the Filipino public wanted government reforms that could 
address societal problems that led to further instability within Filipino society. Leaders 
from both Liberal and Nacionalista parties called for a Constitutional Convention that 
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would create a new Constitution to replace the one ratified in 1935.22 A loose coalition of 
intellectuals, professionals, businessmen, and clergymen supported the creation of such a 
policy. The Constitutional Convention could make concessions to the First Quarter Storm 
protestors, in order to maintain stability within Filipino society.  
However, there were concerns from Imelda Marcos that communists and other 
leftists would dominate the Convention. She feared that the Philippines could become 
another Chile. Kissinger’s October 20 memorandum to Nixon refuted Imelda’s concerns 
by arguing that there were enough pro-Marcos delegates that would offset leftist forces. 
His report noted that the consensus among U.S. officials was that President Marcos could 
“dominate the Convention through pro-Marcos delegates and is already moving to assure 
the election of delegates who will support him.”23 Of the 2600 candidates for 320 
delegate positions, U.S. officials reported that most of the delegates were moderate in 
their outlook on issues that affected U.S. interests. Only fewer than twenty were leftist or 
communist. Kissinger felt confident that the Convention would not seriously impact U.S. 
interests and noted that Marcos would be successful in his endeavors without American 
help. He remained optimistic that President Marcos would manipulate the Constitutional 
Convention to create policies that were favorable to towards American interests.   
American officials continued to support Marcos, who they felt was the best 
person to serve their interests. Byroade felt that Marcos was easy to work with. However, 
the First Quarter Storm seemingly threatened President Marcos’ political legitimacy. This 
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concerned both U.S. and Filipino officials. American officials such as Byroade and 
Kissinger recommended to Marcos that he create populist programs to prevent a possible 
revolution from happening. The upcoming Constitutional Convention would also attempt 
to help create reforms that would benefit Filipino society. U.S. officials remained 
optimistic that pro-Marcos forces would prevail, and did not want to intervene. The U.S. 
trusted him to work in their favor. This was reinforced by the Nixon Doctrine, which 
allowed President Marcos to preserve American interests, with minimal presence. U.S. 
officials supported Marcos not only because he preserved these interests, but also the 
political turmoil at the time threatened his ability to serve them.  
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CHAPTER 4 
1971: CHAOS AND DISORDER 
 
 
 
The year 1971 led to further disorder and chaos in Filipino society, already 
riddled with significant violence and political instability. Anti-American forces within the 
Filipino elite, such as businessman Eugenio Lopez, hoped to remove Marcos and reverse 
many of the benefits the U.S. received in the Philippines. The Philippines also continue to 
experienced significant political violence, much of it from leftist groups. During that 
summer, the recently formed Constitutional Convention was split into pro and anti-
Marcos factions, who could not agree on measures. However, American officials 
remained optimistic that pro-Marcos factions would prevail and introduce measures 
favorable to American interests. At the same time, Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., of the 
Liberal Party emerged as a significant member of Marcos’ opposition. Tragedy struck his 
party with the Plaza Miranda bombing, which killed several people and injured several 
Liberal senatorial candidates during a rally in August. Marcos blamed these attacks on 
Aquino and the Communist guerillas. Despite this serious blow to the Liberals, they 
swept the senatorial elections in November. American officials continued to support 
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President Marcos, knowing that he continued to serve business and military interests. 
They were also concerned that his successor could reverse this.  
In the month of January, Byroade discussed with Nixon recent developments 
regarding the overall political and economic situation in the Philippines, particularly of 
those serving American interests. Initially, Byroade told Nixon that the overall situation 
was not good.1 However, he also felt there were some positive developments. Byroade 
praised President Marcos’ economic advisors who formulated policies that were 
favorable to foreign investment. According to him, Marcos hired U.S.-educated 
technocrats who put fiscal controls into effect.2 He noted that these advisors understood 
that “discriminating against American business interests might cost the Philippines a 
divestment of $600 million.”3 By praising Marcos’ economic advisors, Byroade was 
willing to support President Marcos during a time of political instability because he 
served American business interests.  
 Later in the conversation, Ambassador Byroade noted that Marcos’ political rival, 
businessman Eugenio “Geny” Lopez, threatened President Marcos’ ability to remain in 
office. Lopez owned ABS-CBN Television Corporation and the Manila Times 
newspaper. Byroade described him as “a sour, vicious, and bitter person who wanted to 
drive the U.S. from the Philippines.”4 Interestingly enough, Geny’s brother Fernando was 
Marcos’ Vice President. Byroade described the Vice President as “fairly a good man, but 
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rather stupid” compared to his brother.5 He expressed concern that Geny might use his 
influence to unseat President Marcos and control the Philippines through his brother. One 
year later, President Marcos would shut down both ABS-CBN and the Manila Times 
shortly after declaring martial law, which undermined the Lopez family’s influence. 
Byroade continued to support President Marcos, knowing there were anti-Marcos forces 
that also threatened American interests as well.  
Byroade then noted that Marcos might declare martial law within the city of 
Manila and suspend habeas corpus. Prior to Byroade’s meeting with Nixon, Marcos 
requested that Byroade ask his American counterpart if he would support these measures. 
Nixon told Byroade that they would support Marcos “so long he was doing it to preserve 
the system against those who would destroy it in the name of liberty.”6 Nixon also noted 
that they would support someone who would be trying to preserve order. He showed 
prudence by offering support for martial law, but noted that President Marcos needed 
justification for declaring it. While not giving unconditional support for martial law, 
Nixon allowed Marcos to take action independently from the United States.  
President Marcos continued to work on his plans for declaring martial law that 
spring. He worked out plans for military reorganization, mass arrests of political 
opponents, nationwide censorship, and curfews.7 However, Marcos needed an act of 
violence that would be the catalyst for his declaration. At the end of a discussion amongst 
his generals, Marcos agreed to an undefined strategy, which consisted of provoking 
radicals into committing violent acts. President Marcos began to move ahead with his 
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military reorganization plans. However, he decided to halt his plans through a political 
dare from the opposition Liberal Party and opposition senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. They 
challenged him to make the upcoming November senatorial elections a referendum on the 
President.8 Marcos felt confident that his candidates could defeat the Liberals, in the 
aftermath of his successful reelection campaign two years prior.   
The political situation in the Philippines remained unstable due to violence, 
supposedly from leftists, which continued to affect everyday life in the Philippines. In 
January, unknown groups hurled explosive devices into the Esso and Caltex offices in 
Manila, killing one employee and injuring four others. Police found leftist People’s 
Revolutionary Front issued leaflets found near the Caltex office that read, “This is the 
anger of the Filipino people against U.S. imperialism.”9 On March 30, six young leftist 
activists attempted to hijack a Philippine Air Lines flight schedule from Manila to Davao. 
At least two of the six hijackers were sympathizers of the leftist student group, the 
Kabataang Makabayan (KM).10 The KM espoused Maoism like the NPA, their political 
allies. Despite these events, the State Department concluded that none of the radical 
groups were close to the stage where they could seriously contemplate overthrowing the 
government. However, it also concluded that these groups could find grounds for long-
term encouragement in the country’s current plight. The State Department report did not 
overestimate the Communist threat in the Philippines, but it continued to view them as a 
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legitimate threat to Filipino society. While they could not overthrow President Marcos 
they felt that the politicization of the large student population had potential to undermine 
the Filipino oligarchy’s influence upon its country. These events contributed to the 
political unrest and instability that worried the Filipino public.  
On June 11, the Constitutional Convention convened at the Manila Hotel to 
debate provisions for new constitution that could alleviate much of the political 
instability. Former Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia was sworn in as the 
convention’s president. However, Garcia died of a heart attack three days later. Former 
President Diosdado Macapagal, Marcos’ predecessor, succeeded Garcia. The Convention 
was well underway in its attempt to reform Filipino society.  
 Around the same time, Liberal Party Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. of 
Tarlac province emerged as an important opposition leader. Aquino was born into one of 
the Philippines’ most prominent oligarchic families. His grandfather was a general, while 
his father was Speaker of the House during World War II. His wife, Corazon, was born 
into the Cojuangco family, another prominent clan within the Filipino oligarchy. She 
became President Marcos’ successor in 1986. Ninoy was elected Senator in 1967, and 
had ambitions of succeeding Marcos upon expiration of his term in 1973.11 Leading up to 
President Marcos’ declaration of martial law, he verbally attacked President Marcos 
many times. The Senator accused Marcos of creating a garrison state. Aquino’s anti-
Marcos rhetoric continued until martial law, when authorities arrested him for charges of 
treason. 
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 Later that summer, the Plaza Miranda bombings became the catalyst that allowed 
President Marcos to take extraordinary measures. On August 21, the Liberal Party held a 
rally for its senatorial candidates in the upcoming November election at the Plaza 
Miranda, a public square in Manila. Unknown assailants hurled grenades onto the stage, 
killing nine people and injuring about a hundred. The Plaza Miranda bombings wounded 
almost the entire party leadership. Marcos tried to blame the NPA and Senator Aquino, 
but there was no conclusive evidence on who was responsible. Nonetheless, this bombing 
reflected the political unrest at that time, and also resulted in Marcos’ expansion of 
presidential powers.  
President Marcos responded to this incident by suspending habeas corpus, which 
he justified during a TV news conference.  According to Frank Maestrone, political 
counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Manila, Marcos described his suspension as a 
preventative measure.12 The Philippine president also argued that his military forces 
could not properly deal with political dissidents unless he suspended habeas corpus. 
Marcos noted that his suspension was not unprecedented. He mentioned that in 1950, 
then-President Elpidio Quirino suspended habeas corpus after twenty-two incidents. By 
contrast, Marcos displayed a graph that included over one thousand incidents. This graph 
seemingly justified President Marcos’ actions by noting how much worse the situation 
seemed than the events in 1950. Marcos’ suspension of habeas corpus would foreshadow 
his martial law declaration in the following year.  
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 Following the bombings, Ambassador Byroade met with both President and Mrs. 
Marcos to discuss Marcos’ habeas corpus suspension. Upon meeting with the 
Ambassador, President Marcos told him that he did not suspend habeas corpus solely on 
the Plaza Miranda incident, but that “this was the last straw.”13 Marcos told him that he 
was determined to stop the Communist-led insurgency in the Philippines. He assured 
Byroade that he would not misuse the suspension for political purposes or against 
personal enemies. Marcos also said that it would not be difficult to have the 
Constitutional Convention extend his tenure of office, but he would not do that.14 
However, he noted that he would remain in power if the country were in a condition that 
he could not leave the office of President. While President Marcos did not confirm plans 
to remain in power, he did not rule it out as a response to the seemingly unstable political 
situation. The Plaza Miranda bombing gave him the opportunity to expand his power.  
Despite the Plaza Miranda attacks, the Liberal Party successfully captured six of 
eight Senate seats in the election, which surprised President Marcos. The Filipino public 
supported the Liberals out of sympathy. The Liberals also ran a successful campaign, 
arguing that President Marcos’ mismanagement of the Filipino government led the 
Philippines to the brink of revolution.15 Marcos feared that the Liberal victories in the 
Senate would give the party momentum that would lead them to victory in next 
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presidential election.16 This made him concerned that this would hurt his party’s ability to 
remain in power after his term expired in 1973.  
 In addition to the Liberal Party victories, certain Constitutional Convention 
delegates threatened President Marcos’ ability to remain in power. While the 
Communists did not influence the Convention, many of the delegates were businessmen 
and lawyers who wanted power for themselves and their friends. These groups 
represented a segment of the Filipino elite who was opposed to the overall U.S. presence 
in the Philippines. This concerned President Marcos, who hoped to persuade delegates to 
vote for pro-Marcos and pro-American measures. In a December 1985 interview with 
journalist Raymond Bonner, Byroade noted that he and Marcos hatched a plot to defeat 
anti-Marcos and anti-American provisions being considered by delegates. Byroade also 
told Bonner that he would “take the details of what they did to his grave.”17 His 
involvement in the Constitutional Convention reflected the U.S.’ continued support of 
President Marcos. Despite potential threats from the anti-American elite, Byroade and 
Marcos felt they could manipulate the Convention in their favor.  
During this time, the Constitutional Convention discussed sensitive issues such as 
curbing the Marcoses ability to hold political power after 1973. According to an October 
13 telegram from the Embassy, delegate Napoleon Rama authored a resolution that 
would exclude both Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos from seeking the presidency after 
1973.18 Marcos’ responded by saying that Rama was motivated by personal hatred during 
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a televised conference.  He implied that the resolution was a response to the exclusion of 
Rama’s brother, who was the governor of Cebu province, from the pro-government 
Nacionalista ticket. However, Marcos claimed that he did dissuade delegates from 
supporting the resolution. President Marcos tried to criticize Rama in order to 
delegitimize his resolution. Marcos acted tactfully by noting that he was not trying to 
dissuade delegates from voting for it. However, both U.S. and Filipino officials knew that 
he ultimately wanted delegates to vote against the resolution. President Marcos asserted 
his authority over the delegates, but not in a manner that was blatantly coercive. The 
measure to ban the President and his wife from running after 1973 failed.19 It showed that 
Marcos and Byroade’s plan was successful in attempting to influence the delegates. 
The Convention also debated whether the Philippines should maintain a 
presidential system or adopt a parliamentary system. The latter would benefit President 
Marcos, who was ineligible for a third term in 1973. Under a parliamentary system, he 
would become Prime Minister, which would allow him to hold executive office 
indefinitely.20 Another issue they debated was restricting Presidential powers. According 
to Byroade, delegates were split on whether to terminate the ability of a chief executive to 
suspend habeas corpus. In an October 11 session, twenty-two committee members voted 
for the presidential system, while ten voted for a parliamentary one.21 The majority of 
those voting for the presidential system also voted for reducing the president’s powers 
such as the ability to suspend habeas corpus. However, delegates who voted to ban 
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Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos from running for president began to withdraw their 
signatures.22 The Convention ultimately voted in favor of the parliamentary system and 
against banning the President and Mrs. Marcos.23 President Marcos’ influence within the 
Constitution Convention became more apparent. 
 The situation in the Philippines necessitated American support for President 
Marcos to preserve American interests. The violence scared the country and seemingly 
undermined Marcos’ ability to govern effectively.  Marcos continued to maintain the 
status quo within the U.S.-Philippine relationship, which consisted of preserving the 
American bases and business investments. However, his political rivals within the 
Filipino elite threatened to undo the close relationship that President Marcos and 
Ambassador Byroade created. One way they would try to do this was through voting for 
anti-American and anti-Marcos reforms during the Constitutional Convention. This group 
formed a significant delegate bloc. Despite this, Marcos and Byroade would devise a plan 
to undermine them. Marcos would also successfully consolidate power further through 
his suspension of habeas corpus after the Plaza Miranda bombings. While Marcos did not 
follow through with his martial law plans, suspending habeas corpus was a precursor to 
what would happen in the following year
                                                
22 Rodriguez, The Marcos Years, 52.  
23 Ibid., 53.  
 45 
 
CHAPTER 5 
1972: FROM DEMOCRACY TO DICTATORSHIP 
 
 
 
The political and societal unrest peaked in 1972, which led to Marcos’ declaration 
of martial law. During this time, American officials continued to support Marcos’ 
maintaining of power. They were confident that the Constitutional Convention would not 
threaten the status of American bases. However, the summer would be marred with 
significant violence, much of which was blamed on leftist groups. American businesses 
also experienced significant difficulties during this time, such as threats to land holdings 
in the Philippines. Despite threats to American business interests, Marcos addressed these 
concerns through his decrees. Around the same time, he revealed his blueprint for martial 
law to American officials. However, Senator Aquino would also reveal these issues to the 
public. Despite this, significant violence occurred prior to martial law that allowed 
President Marcos to make his declaration. U.S. officials released no public statements, 
but made private statements in support of it because they felt that martial law would be 
beneficial to these interests.   
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On January 24, President Marcos delivered his State of the Nation Address at the 
Legislative building in Manila. President Marcos began his speech by noting that the 
Philippines would prevail over its challenges in “these times of rupture.”1 He assured the 
Filipino public they could overcome problems that plagued their country. Marcos then 
referenced the U.S.-Philippine relationship. He noted his preference for new 
conversations with the U.S. regarding the creation of potential programs in anticipation of 
the reduction of American forces in Southeast Asia. Marcos also mentioned his 
administration’s role in attracting foreign investments into the country’s economy. 
According to him, automobile companies such as Ford and General Motors were 
interested in manufacturing cars in the Philippines.2 President Marcos’ speech reflected 
his commitment to foreign investment, especially American businesses. He also echoed 
U.S. officials’ plans to reduce the number of military personnel in Southeast Asia. 
Marcos used his State of the Nation Address to acknowledge public support for American 
business presence in the Philippines. He justified this by noting that this could help 
stimulate the Philippine economy. President Marcos’ public support for American 
business interests and discussion over its military presence showed he thought Philippine 
and American interests were aligned.  
 Around this time, the U.S. Embassy paid significant attention to the Constitutional 
Convention’s approach to the status of foreign bases in the Philippines. Embassy officials 
felt that most of the delegates were more supportive of the bases. Its telegram to the State 
Department included a position paper written by pro-Marcos delegates. The paper 
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concluded that continued American presence would be in the Philippines’ self-interest. It 
also argued that a constitution’s language must be sufficiently broad to meet the 
challenge of change.3 However, it noted that it would be necessary to reduce elements of 
U.S.-Philippine security agreements that encroached on Philippine sovereignty. Despite 
these proposed reductions, the telegram concluded that the Philippine government would 
favor retention of the bases. This also remained consistent with the Nixon Doctrine. The 
Convention paid attention to the Philippines’ security and economic agreements with the 
U.S., which included provisions that favored both parties. American policymakers 
concluded that the majority of delegates felt that banning foreign military bases could 
threaten Philippine national security. They remained optimistic that the pro-Marcos 
delegation would continue to push for pro-American measures.   
 This optimism was also reflected in Under Secretary of State John Irwin’s March 
18 memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Marshall Green. The memorandum reiterated maintaining a satisfactory relationship with 
the Philippine government that ensured the availability of the bases, while reducing 
elements of the special relationship with the Philippines. Irwin defined this special 
relationship as excessive Filipino dependence on the United States for military aid.4 It 
recommended that the U.S. should not extend the Laurel-Langley trade agreement. 
Officials felt that American firms affected by its expiration had made appropriate 
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adjustments under how they operate and would continue to do business in the 
Philippines.5 This meant that Laurel-Langley was cumbersome and superfluous to 
American business interests. Lastly, Irwin stressed that the bases were of fundamental 
importance to the U.S., and were likely to become more valuable if other Western Pacific 
states curtailed base rights. This showed the Nixon Administration’s further commitment 
to reducing their military presence to maintain efficiency.  
 In addition to reducing American military presence, U.S. officials attempted to 
remain silent on domestic Filipino issues to prevent complications in the relationship 
between the two countries. In May, Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., criticized the 
Philippines’ dependence on the U.S. for its national security and the American utilization 
of its Filipino bases for the Vietnam War effort. He also set out his foreign policy 
framework that consisted of forty-four points that could be used for a potential campaign 
for president. Ambassador Byroade hoped to challenge Senator Aquino on these issues. 
However, Secretary of State Rogers responded to Byroade by suggesting that Byroade 
“must avoid public discussion of these matters as much as possible.”6 Had the 
ambassador made public criticism of Aquino, anti-American forces in the Philippines 
could interpret this as American intervention in the business of its allies. The U.S. needed 
to stay out of domestic issues to prevent backlash from the Filipino public.  
 The Philippines continued to experience significant violence and unrest during the 
month of July, much of which the government blamed on Communist groups such as 
NPA. On July 3, an explosion occurred at the American Express office in downtown 
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Manila.7 Small, but unexplained, fires followed in the congressional building and in the 
Department of Finance. On July 18, unexploded devices were found in the Thomas 
Jefferson Cultural Center, and in the Publications Division of the Philippine Senate.8 The 
Philippine Armed Forces seized smuggled arms from a ship that they accused of 
supplying Maoist insurgents. Despite supposed threats from Communists, the American 
officials felt that urban terrorism did not fit into the NPA’s plans. They concluded that 
Marcos’ charges were overdrawn, and did not rule out the possibility that his supporters 
were responsible for some of the violence.9 However, violence committed by either party 
scared the Filipino public who felt there was a lack of law and order within their society.  
 The Philippines also experienced significant rainfall in July and August, which 
caused natural disasters throughout the country. In early July, the island of Luzon 
experienced significant flooding that killed over 650 people. Over 80 inches of rainfall 
accumulated within one month. This was equivalent to the average annual rainfall that the 
Philippines usually received.10  In addition to the hundreds killed, these disasters 
displaced millions of people. Much of the streets of Metro Manila were submerged and 
every surrounding river, lake, and stream overflowed.11 The disaster ruined much of the 
rice crop. Food riots and looting broke out in several places. The resulting floods also 
caused an outbreak of cholera and typhoid epidemics. While not directly related to the 
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political turmoil, the floods exacerbated the situation by making the lives of many 
Filipinos more difficult. This resulted in further instability within Filipino society.  
The end of summer brought concerns regarding American business interests in the 
Philippines, most notably in the Quasha decision. The Quasha case concerned a judicial 
determination of the rights acquired by American citizens and corporations through the 
Parity Amendment found in Laurel-Langley trade agreement. This amendment allowed 
American citizens to own land in the Philippines. However, Laurel-Langley was set to 
expire in 1974, which concerned Americans. American William Quasha appealed to the 
Philippine Supreme Court on the status of his land holdings after Laurel-Langley’s 
expiration. On August 17, the court ruled that Quasha’s landholdings were invalid. They 
interpreted the Parity Amendment as allowing American individuals and corporations to 
only purchase land in the public domain.12 The land Quasha purchased had been in 
private hands. The court also ruled that special privileges that American citizens and 
corporations held would end with Laurel-Langley’s expiration in 1974. The Quasha 
decision impacted the American expatriate community in the Philippines because a 
majority of the land purchased by Americans had been privately owned. According to a 
National Security Council memorandum, this would create problems for a significant 
portion of $1 billion in total U.S. investment.13 The Quasha decision worried American 
citizens, who feared they could lose their property.    
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The memorandum suggested that the Philippine Supreme Court could modify its 
decision by affirming the rights of U.S. investors to possess clear title and protecting their 
lands from reversion to Filipino citizens.14 It then mentioned that remedial provisions in a 
new Philippine constitution could resolve problems resulting from the Quasha decision. 
One such provision was the implementation of a parliamentary form of government, 
which would allow Marcos to become Prime Minister and hold executive office after 
1973. This would give Marcos more time to address these concerns. U.S. policymakers 
needed Marcos to remain in power because he helped create a business friendly 
environment.  
The Philippine Supreme Court also threatened business interests with the Luzon 
Stevedoring decision, which prohibited foreigners from holding executive office in 
Filipino-based businesses. The Supreme Court ruled that executive positions were 
reserved for only Filipino citizens. This meant that American citizens could not control 
their subsidiaries through contracts or managerial positions.15 By not being able to own 
their Filipino subsidiaries, this hurt American business executives’ abilities to profit 
significantly from the Philippines.  
Around the same time, President Marcos told U.S. officials that he was 
contemplating whether or not he should proceed with martial law. He knew that asking 
the United States’ advice would provide more legitimacy for his actions. He asked 
Ambassador Byroade about the attitude towards the Philippines in Washington. Byroade 
met with Nixon and Kissinger at the Oval Office, and outlined potential negative 
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consequences of martial law, which was that significant sectors of the Filipino population 
would rebel if the U.S. supported it.16 Nixon did not pay attention and seemed bored 
during much of the discussion.17 Despite this, the three agreed to support Marcos’ 
declaration of martial law on the pretext that it helped put down the Communist 
insurgency. 
Despite the secrecy over martial law, rumors emerged over President Marcos’ 
plans to declare it. Aquino revealed President Marcos’ plans for martial law on the floor 
of the Senate on September 13. His speech warned of the possibility that President 
Marcos was moving to impose martial law. He also noted that the government named the 
plan, “Operation Sagittarius.”  According to Aquino, the Philippine government planned 
to place Manila and nearby provinces under control of the Philippine Constabulatory.18 
Fourteen radical Constitutional Convention delegates also charged that martial law could 
be imposed with the advice and consent of the U.S. military. Editorials also questioned 
whether or not the situation warranted martial law. They also noted that the U.S. 
Embassy did not take the leftist threat seriously as the Philippine government did. The 
significant public backlash had seemingly put into question Marcos’ ability to declare 
martial law.  
Despite this public backlash, President Marcos remained determined to declare 
martial law. One week before martial law, Byroade wrote to the State Department that he 
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believed that Marcos could extend himself through constitutional means, without U.S. 
support. He also noted that martial law would not be an extra-constitutional step if it were 
carried out for purposes specified in the Philippine Constitution.19 Byroade’s statement 
indicated that he would support martial law under certain conditions.  He also mentioned 
that Marcos said that he would act promptly if a part of Manila was burned or if a top 
government official was kidnapped or assassinated. This changes the narrative by 
contradicting Karnow, who mentioned that Byroade kept advising Marcos against 
declaring martial law.20 While Byroade did not express outright support for Marcos’ 
plans for martial law, he gave Marcos advice on how he could declare it.  
 Byroade and Marcos discussed martial law with some caution on how to proceed. 
On September 20, Byroade had a personal conversation with Marcos that pertained to 
concerns regarding the Philippine President’s plans for martial law. The Ambassador also 
noted to Marcos he “was not under instructions” from his superiors and anything he 
might say “would at this point be just personal from” him.21 Byroade also wrote that 
President Marcos needed to remain in a position where he could say that he did not 
accept the Ambassador’s advice. He also reminded the Philippine President that the 
Nixon Administration was in the wind-up phase of their reelection campaign. Byroade 
told Marcos that he felt that Senator George McGovern, the Democratic nominee, would 
seize on a military takeover in the Philippines to use it as proof that Nixon’s foreign 
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policies, particularly in Asia, were failures. Marcos told Byroade that he did not make an 
official decision to declare martial law, but that “planning for it was at an advanced 
state.”22 Marcos also concluded that his country’s Constitution was broader than the 
American one. 23 He felt that the ineffectiveness of the government was enough for him 
to legally declare martial law. He described the problems of Filipino society in a similar 
manner to critics of his Administration. Marcos also felt “his place in history might be 
made if he had the power of drastic reform.”24 This showed that American officials 
experienced some difficulties in their dealings with President Marcos. While they were 
willing to discuss these plans, they understood that they needed to remain silent on the 
matter.  
One day before declaring martial law, President Marcos worked with Ambassador 
Byroade to fix problems American businesses faced in the Philippines. During their 
meeting, Marcos noted that the Philippine Supreme Court should correct its decisions on 
the Quasha and Luzon Stevedoing cases.25 They both agreed that the Supreme Court 
could invalidate them. Regarding Luzon Stevedoring, President Marcos felt that foreign 
executive management would be an asset for companies he described as advanced 
technological enterprises.26 President Marcos pledged to support American business 
interests in these statements. This meeting reinforced both Byroade and Hamilton-
Paterson’s narrative that President Marcos supported American business interests. 
                                                
22 Ibid., 552.  
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Document #259, “Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State” dated 
September 22, 1972, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-
1972, Vol. 20, Southeast Asia, 1969-1972 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2006), 553.  
26 Ibid., 554.    
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Marcos’ removal would prevent him from resolving the issues that stemmed from both 
the Quasha and Luzon Stevedoring decisions.  
To declare martial law, President Marcos needed a catalyst that allowed him to 
declare it without significant public opposition. On September 21, Marcos reported that 
unknown gunmen tried to assassinate his Defense Secretary, Juan Ponce Enrile, whose 
motorcade had allegedly been ambushed. Years later, in 1986, Enrile admitted that his 
assassination attempt was faked.27 Nonetheless, this became the pretext President Marcos 
utilized to declare martial law. This fake assassination attempt reflected Marcos’ 
willingness to take extraordinary measures that allowed him to declare martial law.  
At midnight, September 22, President Marcos announced Proclamation No. 1081, 
which imposed martial law throughout the Philippines. He officially proclaimed it at mid-
day September 23. The Proclamation imposed a national curfew, ordered the arrest of 
Marcos’ political opponents, and closed many media outlets. They also cancelled all 
domestic commercial flights. The Philippine government suspended international cable 
and telephone traffic. Proclamation No. 1081 ended democracy in the Philippines. 
Ferdinand Marcos had become a dictator, not unlike his Asian contemporaries Suharto in 
Indonesia or Park Chung-hee in South Korea.  
The Filipino public initially accepted martial law because it halted much of the 
crime and violence that plagued Philippine society. The curfew kept teenage youth at 
home, relieving concerned parents. Marcos convinced much of the Filipino public that 
martial law would resolve the nation’s problems. Martial law seemingly brought stability 
to the Filipino people, who experienced little of it in the past three years.  
                                                
27 Karnow, In Our Image, 359. 
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The United States remained silent on the matter, and denied involvement in 
Marcos’ plans.28 Kissinger and Byroade gave private support for martial law.  Kissinger 
felt martial law would not pose serious problems for U.S. security and economic relations 
with the Philippines. He felt that “individual business operations might be even be 
improved.”29 However, he recognized that critics of U.S. foreign policy would interpret 
this as tacit support for Marcos’ move. Nonetheless, Kissinger felt that this silence would 
help the U.S. maintain access to its military bases.  
Byroade reiterated this sentiment, noting that the U.S. should not provide any 
public statement of support for martial law. The Ambassador also concluded that they 
should “quietly continue business as usual” with the Philippine government, while 
monitoring “any potential abuse of his new powers.”30 Despite this concern over Marcos’ 
extension over power, Byroade remained optimistic that he would not abuse them. U.S. 
officials remained silent on martial law because it would allow them to maintain 
American business operations and bases.  
American business leaders also expressed their support for President Marcos 
during this time. Tristan Beplat, President of the Philippine American Chamber of 
Commerce in New York, argued that President Marcos would continue to support 
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American investment.31 While Beplat did not make explicit mention of martial law, he 
felt that American businesses would suffer if Marcos fell. He also believed that the 
Quasha decision was a political issue that the Philippine government used to pressure the 
U.S. to be more responsive to President Marcos’ desires.32 Following martial law, the 
American Chamber of Commerce also expressed their support to President Marcos.33 The 
American business community remained optimistic that President Marcos would 
formulate policies that favored their interests.  
President Marcos served these business interests promising to reverse both the 
Quasha and Luzon Stevedoring decisions. Three days after martial law, President Marcos 
outlined his economic policy to foreign journalists. These included provisions such as 
permitting foreign nationals to hold executive office. Another included permitting 
holdings, whose titles were nullified by the Supreme Court, to be disposed over a long 
period of time to individual Filipinos.34 President Marcos fulfilled these promises issuing 
decrees in 1973. Martial law allowed Marcos to serve American business interests more 
effectively.  
Ambassador Byroade praised Marcos for proposing these measures, but expressed 
concern that President Marcos would settle these problems through Presidential decree.35 
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He felt it would prove to Marcos’ opposition that the U.S. supported martial law. 
Byroade believed that maneuvering the Philippine Supreme Court into handling the 
problems would have been preferable because it would provide more legitimacy than 
Marcos himself.36 Nonetheless, Byroade felt that these decrees were beneficial because it 
cleared significant obstacles to foreign investment in the Philippines.  
American officials experienced some difficulty with creating policy towards the 
Philippines, but consistently supported President Marcos while his legitimacy was 
seemingly put into question. They felt that he would create policies that continued to 
serve American business and military interests. The Constitutional Convention did not 
pose a threat to U.S. bases. While American business interests were threatened, Marcos 
would successfully fix these programs through decrees. American officials continued to 
express concern with Marcos’ plans for martial law, but tried to help him declare it while 
working within the Philippine Constitution. A potential successor could try to undo 
everything that President Marcos sought to do. U.S. officials needed Marcos to remain in 
power not only because he served American interests, but because he provided stability 
that preserved these interests. While Bonner and Hamilton-Paterson know that Marcos 
served American interests, they did not know that President Marcos and Ambassador 
Byroade met one day prior to martial law to discuss how to resolve Quasha and Luzon 
Stevedoring. This reinforces their position that Marcos effectively served American 
interests. U.S. officials such as Byroade and Kissinger felt optimistic that martial law 
would be beneficial to Americas interests in the Philippines.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Under martial law, President Marcos continued to serve American business 
interests and his own. He supported a March 1973 foreign investment law that guaranteed 
investors new rights, which eased anxieties over the situation in the Philippines.1 Marcos’ 
government never forced Americans to relinquish their properties. Martial law did not 
change the status quo with respect to the American business activities in the Philippines. 
In addition to business interests, President Marcos agreed to keep American 
bases, which remained important to strategic interests in Asia. The end of American 
involvement in the Vietnam War led to the loss of a former Asian ally to the 
Communists. The Carter Administration agreed to $500 million in aid for the Philippines 
in exchange for base rights.2 President Jimmy Carter felt that the Philippines remained 
strategically significant. This would compromise his foreign policy rhetoric, which 
stressed human rights. American officials knew they could not lose its military bases after 
ending American involvement in Vietnam. 
                                                
1 Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980 (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1988), 258.  
2 Raymond Bonner, Waltzing With a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Foreign Policy 
(New York: Times Books, 1987), 210. 
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 Marcos lifted martial law in 1981 with Proclamation No. 2045.3 However, habeas 
corpus remained suspended in various provinces such as Mindanao. Marcos also retained 
legislative and emergency powers. His other presidential decrees remained legal and 
binding. President Marcos also called for elections in 1981, to legitimize his hold over the 
presidency. However, the opposition did not participate because they felt it was 
illegitimate. Marcos won with eighty-six percent of the vote.4 Despite the formal end of 
martial law, Marcos continued to rule like a dictator.   
President Marcos’ legitimacy crumbled after the assassination of his biggest 
political rival. In 1983, Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., arrived at Manila International 
Airport spending many years in exile. Upon exiting the plane, an unknown gunman shot 
and killed him. While not confirmed, one of Marcos’ men was allegedly responsible. This 
shocked the Filipino public, who became more disenchanted with Marcos.  
Aquino’s widow, Corazon, ran against Marcos in the 1986 snap elections. The 
results showed that President Marcos defeated her with a majority. Despite this, the 
Filipino public felt the results were invalid. The People Power Revolution emerged, 
which consisted of clergymen, Liberal Party members, and leftist activists. They 
protested for three days. Secretary of State George Shultz recommended to President 
Reagan that Marcos step down.5 They also agreed to grant Marcos asylum in the U.S. 
The Marcoses fled to Hawaii, where Ferdinand died in 1989. Shortly after the ousting, 
Mrs. Aquino was sworn in as President.  
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Between 1969 and 1972, three issues defined the U.S.’ relationship with the 
Marcos government. The first was the significant political unrest that threatened to 
undermine President Marcos’ legitimacy. The second concerned U.S. application of the 
Nixon Doctrine to the Philippines. The third issue related to how Marcos maintained 
military and business interests in the Philippines. These three issues were crucial to 
understanding American support for President Marcos.  
 The political unrest in the Philippines contributed significantly to American 
support for Marcos because they were concerned that the current situation could 
undermine his legitimacy. The First Quarter Storm concerned American officials, who 
recommended that the Philippine government introduce reforms to alleviate the 
situation.6 They hoped this would prevent the situation from exacerbating. During this 
time, the Communist movement would become more prominent in the Philippines. 
However, U.S. officials felt that they did not pose a serious threat to Marcos. 
Nonetheless, American officials also believed that the current situation was encouraging 
for the Communists.7 The political unrest helped understand the U.S.’ role in the 
Philippines because it would lead to American support for President Marcos. The U.S. 
needed stability, which was an important aspect of the Nixon Doctrine.  
U.S. officials applied the Nixon Doctrine to the Philippines by reducing its 
military presence and ensuring that Marcos remained President. The U.S. sent riot gear to 
                                                
6 Document #207, “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) 
to President Nixon” dated February 7, 1970, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969-1972, Vol. 20, Southeast Asia, 1969-1972 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing 
Office, 2006), 440. 
7 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Philippines: The Radical Movements,” 
May 3, 1971, The Philippines: U.S. Policy During the Marcos Years, 1965-1986, Digital National Security 
Archive, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., iv, 
http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_ph/docview/1679142982/. 
 62 
 
the Philippines around May 1970.8 By doing so, the United States aided the Philippines in 
its own self-defense with financial support, instead of sending in U.S. troops. This let 
U.S. officials use its resources more efficiently to protect its allies. U.S. support also 
ensured that Marcos stayed in power. In January 1971, Nixon told Byroade that he would 
support Marcos if he were to declare martial law preserve liberty.9 Nixon interpreted 
martial law as a means for Marcos to preserve order and defend himself from internal 
enemies. The U.S. would provide indirect support through financial aid, which allowed 
Marcos to use American resources for his benefit. The Nixon Doctrine was significant to 
understand U.S. officials’ relationship with the Marcos government because it helped 
ensure that Marcos remained in power by emphasizing stability.  
President Marcos served U.S. military interests, which consisted primarily of 
preserving American base rights. Vietnamization increased the importance of America’s 
Filipino bases because fewer troops meant more naval presence. Subic Bay would 
become a more important hub of operations. Pro-Marcos Constitutional Convention 
delegates drafted a paper that supported keeping the U.S. bases, arguing that it was in the 
Philippines self-interest.10 Marcos’ preservation of base rights were important to 
understanding his relationship with the United States because the U.S. needed these 
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bases, which were important hubs of American military operations in Asia. American 
officials needed to support Marcos, in order maintain access to its bases.  
U.S. officials also continued to tacitly support President Marcos because he 
served American business interests. Byroade praised Marcos’ economic advisors, whose 
fiscal controls saved American companies $600 million.11 This also reinforced Bonner 
and Hamilton-Paterson’s narrative. The Philippine Supreme Court also threatened 
American business interests through its Luzon Stevedoring and Quasha decisions. 
However, President Marcos agreed to reverse these decisions.12 Shortly after martial law, 
Marcos issued decrees that allowed American citizens to retain property in the 
Philippines and hold executive office in their companies. This affirms Bonner and 
Hamilton-Paterson’s narrative that Marcos was effective for serving American interests. 
American business interests were important to understanding the U.S.’ relationship with 
Marcos because 
The Nixon Doctrine desired political stability, which depended on U.S. support 
for President Marcos, who served American business and military interests. While there 
were no prospects for revolution, the political instability could threaten Marcos’ ability to 
remain President. Marcos also faced threats from the Filipino elite such as Lopez or 
Aquino, both of whom could depose him. President Marcos continued to aid business 
concerns, while permitting base rights. His removal could threaten much of this, which 
meant that the United States needed President Marcos to remain in power.
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